Though it is neither desirable nor likely that an emergency will materialize in North Korea in the near future, it is necessary to be prepared for such an abrupt incidence. This paper examines necessary measures in case of a collapse of North Korea.
Introduction
There always has been a concern regarding the future of North Korea. The possible collapse of North Korea is a very serious problem for Northeast Asia, especially for South Korea, who will bear the brunt of the care of refugees, economic instability, social chaos, and many other challenges. Judging from North Korea's current political and economic situation, it is unlikely that a collapse of North Korea will occur immediately. Though it is neither desirable nor likely that an emergency will materialize in North Korea in the near future, it is best to be prepared for such an abrupt incidence. Facing such a crisis without preparation will lead to disastrous and uncontrollable outcomes. This paper examines necessary measures in case of an emergency or collapse of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
The debate on what emergency and how it would be possible will be omitted from this analysis as it is not the major concern of this paper. Upon a scrutinized look at present conditions, it is assumed that the constant economic crises and political disorder of the North will disable the controls of the social functions of the government, resulting in a larger number of North Korean refugees fleeing into South Korea and China. It is also assumed that the North Korean government will lose its ability and will to control this "South-bound rush". This situation will be referred to as the "emergency" situation of the North throughout this analysis. This paper hypothetically assumes two stages. The first is the collapse stage, in which it is assumes that North Korea's economy seriously worsens, causing a mass exodus of its citizens as a result of fear and famine. Though hundreds of North Korean refugees flee to China everyday, during an emergency, the military will likely be unable to stop the advance since even they are poorly fed and also understanding of the choices made by defectors at the brink of starvation. Because of this weakened support from the military, the North Korean regime is 4 forecast to significantly lose control of the northern areas of the Korean peninsula. In a few weeks, the situation becomes more serious, and thousands of defectors leave their hometown searching for food and life. It is assumed that they are now also heading towards South Korea as well as China. The regime has completely lost its power to control this incidence, which leads to a vacuum of power. With this unmanageable scope of refugees, neighbor countries such as Korea and China start intervening in the matter.
The second stage of affairs is an integration stage in which the exodus is stabilized by aid from South Korea and the international community. South Korea expands its influence in North Korea, and countries such as the U.S., China, Russia, Japan and South Korea agree to integrate North Korea with South Korea. There are many if's for this agreement to be realized, but this paper will not cover the necessary conditions and measures. This stage is a beginning of an absorptive unification, in which one side resigns their national sovereignty so that the other can lead the unification process with a unambiguous position, as seen in both Germany and
Vietnam.
1 This paper does not cover the whole integration process, but deals with major issues at the start of the integration stage. The necessary government policies needed for the time of crisis in North Korea will be analyzed. The second section of this paper will cover crisis management during the collapse period. Major tasks will include refugee relief, economic aid to the North, and economic stabilization of the South Korean economy. This section also explains the government organizations that should deal with the tasks of the collapse stage.
Section three covers the integration stage and discusses how to control the administration of the northern areas. It also provides guidance on how to change the South Korean government to deal with the crisis. In case an emergency does occur, the North and South may go directly towards full-scale unification or undergo a period of temporary separation before unification. A period of temporary separation can ease the effects of an abrupt unification by creating a transition period where the North and South are governed separately while the differences between the two are lessened. As a precursor to this, this paper's focus will be on domestic policy and will not cover international relations.
Collapse Stage a) Crisis Management Body
When there are symptoms of an impending DPRK's collapse, it is important that to have accurate information along with an examination of preparation systems and crisis management bodies for the emergency. Checking early-warning systems and strengthening diplomatic efforts that will enhance cooperation with neighbor countries is a given. While measures to deal with the sharply increasing refugees from the North are needed, measures to check for even larger numbers and issues in the future must also not be neglected. This must be done by multiple agencies to assist the situation as best possible.
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At the time of the crisis, it is of utmost important that all ministries work together very closely, and for this purpose, the National Security Council at the Blue House, chaired by the President should act as the control tower. To support the basic direction set by NSC at the cabinet level, the following committees will be needed to manage the crises of the collapse stage: the Committee for Emergency Relief, Committee for Refugees, and the Committee for Economic
Stabilization. The Minister of Unification, Minister of Government Administration and Home
Affairs, and the Minister of Finance and Economy should be the committee chairs, respectively.
For quick decision making and action, each ministry should work as their secretariat own and avoid establishing others.
b) Refugee Relief
North Korean refugees will mostly cross the border into China. Some might also cross the sea or the DMZ and arrive in South Korea. The scale or number of refugees is not of great significance in this paper. However, it is assumed that the numbers will be large enough to cause an emergency situation in North Korea. To cite the German case for reference, in just two months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, 180,000 East Germans fled from their homes before the population flow stabilized. If the symptoms of an anticipated emergency do not actually lead to a collapse but to a new regime in the North, the emergency situation may be settled without moving towards the unification of Koreas. South Korea must then discuss repatriation of the refugees with the North. It is assumed that the new regime will be benevolent towards the refugees since they
were not the regime the refugees fled from. If these circumstances are explained to the refugees, many may think that the new regime will be friendly to them.
In an example from Vietnam, refugees that had fled to many other Asian countries after communization were compulsorily repatriated from April 1995. According to a report from a UN investigator, there was no persecution from the Vietnamese government towards the first group of 68,000 refugees sent back to Vietnam. If the aforementioned scenario should take place, an agreement on the repatriation of refugees will be the first official agreement with the new regime in the North and shall have a positive effect on bilateral relations. However, measures to help the settlement must be provided for those who wish to remain in the South.
Currently, South Korea is reducing direct financial support to North Korean refugees and is instead emphasizing training and adaptation programs. Support system for refugees must be set so that so that going back home appears to be a better choice than remaining in the South.
The costs in accommodating and supporting the settlement of refugees must primarily be paid by the government budget, but nationwide fundraising campaigns and international participation must be induced as well.
Should and when South Korea develops a stronger influence over the North, a more active policy may be needed to restrain refugees. Measures to prevent the occurrence of more of local governments will be given another chance to consider returning to their hometowns.
Plans for refugees overseas are also needed. Since most refugees will head to China, cooperation with the Chinese government is extremely important. As a preliminary step, diplomatic cooperation must be induced so that China, or other countries in concern including Russia or Japan, grants temporary aid instead of sending refugees back to North Korea against their will. South Korea must clearly specify that they are willing to share or even shoulder all costs involved for the refugees. Under this condition, the South Korean government will have to send people to China, for instance, to establish asylum facilities and for examining the personal information on the refugees. Since this is a very delicate diplomatic issue, South
Korea should work very closely with China and the U.S.
As a second step, the country of concern, together with South Korea, and the UN, should form an "International Convention for North Korean Refugees" to collectively act on the issue while 11 also internationalizing concern for the problem. When many Vietnamese refugees escaped to Thailand, Thailand established the "International Convention for Refugees in Indochina", demanding that the international community also share responsibility in humanitarian issues.
Tentatively named the "International Convention for North Korean Refugees", cooperation with other countries should be made so that sheltering facilities are built near North Korean borders where refugees are expected to gather. South Korea must, inevitably, take part in paying for the costs of the convention. Refugees must be able to stay in the facilities until the situation in North Korea has stabilized enough for them to return.
In the third step, South Korea should try to negotiate with the governments of China, Russia, or North, the production of grains will drastically decrease and the transportation system will be hobbled, bringing severe starvation to North Korean citizens. Hence, prompt action on possible food shortages is the key to crisis management.
The type of aid towards North Korea must differ accordingly. In the earlier stages when the DPRK regime still holds power, direct food supplies to the North will be difficult. As long as there is a government in North Korea, the South can simply deliver food to the North. In this case, the South Korean government will also naturally be able to request some transparency on how the food is distributed.
Instant noodles and bread can be transported quicker than grains and should thus be sent in the earlier stages of aid relief to quickly neutralize instances of starvation. Additionally, basic medicine, salt, and other necessities must be included in the supplies. Transporting via air to focused areas where southern-fleeing refugees will most likely be will be a very effective measure for the initial stages.
When South Korea strengthens its influence over the northern areas, more active means of involvement will be necessary as the South Korean government can act more expediently in
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North Korea. Aspects of danger will still exist and thus government troops will be needed to help secure the environment. The key point in this stage is to swiftly re-establish the supply systems of North Korea and to minimize citizen movement.
Since North Korea has long maintained a rationing system, distribution stations remain in each village or town. After confirming these locations, major supply bases in North Korea should be selected to construct a supply system that is similar in function as to ones in the South. Another important question is who should do the job. In each supply base in North Korea,
South Korean NGOs and volunteers should play the major role as opposed to the ROK military. Additionally, although international participation overall will be an essential element, for distribution stations, it will likely be better to work directly with North Koreans. The entire food supply process is a way of boosting morale and convincing them of their improved futures.
d) Stabilizing the South Korean Economy
South Korea will encounter serious economic instability with an emergency situation in North Korea. Some possible consequences include an outflow of foreign investment funds,
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withdrawal of deposits, illegal outflows of foreign currency, speculation, and inflation. Thus, minimizing these issues is important not only for the South, but for the North as well.
Changes in the foreign currency market will be the most serious issue. Investing in Korea will become more risky and the value of the Korean won will be expected to fall, leading to the possibility of large withdrawals from foreign investors. Primarily, the outflow of short-term investment funds may be substantial. However, considering the foreign exchange reserve of approximately US$240 billion as of January 2006, a foreign exchange crisis seems unlikely.
What is more probable is a crash in the stock market or short-term liquidity constraints due to a sudden outflow of foreign investment funds.
Devaluation of the Korean won will also be unavoidable. Nonetheless, policies should be focused on eradicating such pessimistic predictions that the won will continue to devaluate. In serious cases, a Tobin tax can be considered. A Tobin tax is a policy that attempts to restrain the outflow of foreign exchange holdings by levying a certain amount of tax when the won is converted to foreign currency. Tobin taxes have been applied previously in Chile and
Colombia. Originally, the tax is a policy that levies a low rate of transaction tax on the sale and purchase of foreign currency, but in this case, it can be selectively applied only when purchasing.
Cautious consideration is required since the credit of Korea will also be harmed as a result of the tax. Korean firms investing overseas may also have hardships. Nevertheless, if the external impact of the North Korean emergency is safely settled, credit will not be harmed in the long term since this extreme situation will not be repeated in the future.
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Another possibility is for large depositors to withdraw at once, fearing the damage of insolvent financial agencies and severe inflation. The withdrawn money will likely be converted to a demand for dollars, gold, real estate, and other goods. This will lead to a sharp rise in the price of gold and real estate, and the devaluation of the won. It will also be more difficult for small depositors to join in the withdrawal since they do not have special alternatives after withdrawing their money. These large-scale withdrawals cause monetary stringency or the bankruptcy of enterprises and banks. Levying taxes on withdrawals over a certain amount for a very short period of time, at most several days, should be considered. The initiation of such plans must be done rapidly and with a clear schedule. Otherwise, it will likely stir more withdrawals and investor pessimism.
If stock prices crash and the won devalues, the instability in the financial market will flash danger signals to major domestic companies attempting to protect their management rights.
There is a large possibility for foreign capital to become main hunters of management rights, using the geopolitical dangers of Korea as an opportunity. Therefore, if various regulations restricting companies' protection of management rights still exist at the time, abolition of such regulations must be considered. In addition, in view of the risk of illegal foreign currency outflow, measures must be made, but cautiously so that economic activities overseas are not negatively affected. Supervision on transactions with possibilities of irregular dealings, such as transactions among the headquarters and the branches, or domestic headquarters and foreign investment companies, must be reinforced. Inflation as a consequence of an economic slump, the hoarding of necessities, and aid for
North Korea is in a way an inevitable cost that South Korea will have to take absorb. However, when there is a possibility of integration, the South Korean economy will have the opportunity to leap forward.
Integration Stage
In the integration stage, each ministry will face new challenges that must be overcome. Since there are many uncertainties, it is difficult to predict policy directions when integrating.
Therefore, this paper focuses on the preparations of government organizations. If the government is ready to address the upcoming problems with organizational preparation, the potential crisis can be managed with much greater ease.
a) Policies for Temporary Separation
Since the two Koreas show a huge divide in many aspects, there is no doubt that the two countries should make a gradual convergence before unification. The South Korean government has therefore emphasized a gradual unification of the Koreas since the late 1980s.
A "big-bang unification" as evidenced in Germany will likely create chaotic consequences for the Korean Peninsula. Even if a "big-bang" unification takes place as a result of the collapse of the North, South Korea will likely have to find a way to temporarily separate the two Koreas to handle massive migration issues.
In the German example, the East German Mark was intentionally appreciated in order to curb the massive migration flow. This in turn increased average wages in the East German area, which deterred investment. This is one reason why the East German area is still supported by the West. Although raising wages can be done easily and quickly, creating jobs is the best way to stop migration. However, this can be difficult since job creation takes time. Additionally, the migration of North Koreans will not be welcomed by trade unions in the South. Therefore, political pressure to raise average wages in the North might come from both sides of Korea.
However, as seen in Germany, wage gaps must stay wide to induce investment. Although this can be a dilemma for the Korean government, temporary separation is a ready answer. given the highest priority. Other economic and social systems in the North and South will remain as they were, but the transitions of the North, and even the South, will be gradually put into practice during the separation period.
There are of course doubts about the feasibility of temporary separation. If the emergency of North Korea brings a large-scale escape to South Korea, temporarily maintaining the border between the countries may not be realistic. However, the measures for refugees suggested in the first half of this paper are well implemented, and the border can be maintained.
Merging the two Koreas without temporary separation may also be publicly supported in the During the temporary separation, the Northern area should start transforming its economic, social, and political systems. First, it will be crucial to create policies that aid in the transfer of the Northern economic system into a market economy in preparation for complete integration with the South. Introducing new systems of finance, taxation, and law that support a market economy to North Korea, where experience with capitalism and market economies are close to 19 zero, will be a very challenging task. Considering the discouragement and frustration with current North Korean refugee experiences in the South, educating people on the market economy is therefore extremely important. South Korea needs to start this project, even now if possible.
Other typical transition programs include the liberalization of prices and the privatization of ownership. Though liberalization is an important task, especially in fields such as prices and trade, natural measures will rapidly unfold with full-scale economic integration with the South.
The privatization of state-owned enterprises will not be an imminent issue, considering that competitive firms owned by the government will be rare. However, the privatization of land will be a very important task that should be completed during the separation period. Land should be privatized for free and given to those who have stayed in the North during the transition period. This will be a very powerful policy instrument to curtail migration flows to the South.
b) Administrative Control in the Northern Areas
With the collapse of the regime and integration with the South, all central government organizations of North Korea should be abolished. In drawing plans for a unified Korea, central government organizations of North Korea will not be of much relevance. Central government organizations of North Korea show fundamental differences when compared with those of the South. Therefore, examinations focus on how to control the local governments of North Korea.
Whereas central government organizations of the North will mostly be eliminated, local government organizations can be maintained with restructuring and reforms. Preserving 20 the current local government organizations of the North are necessary since replacing all human resources by South Korean government officials will not be possible and will trigger resistance from North Koreans. North Korea's local government two-story structure is in essence the same as the South's: higher level "Do" (province) levels operate in conjunction with lower level "Si" or "Kun" (city or country, respectively).
Therefore, the North does not have to change their structure drastically prior to full- However, the committee should have a strong secretariat, unlike the presidential committees mentioned above.
Second, a Privatization Office, an organization to deal with the privatization of land and North Korean national enterprises, as was done by Germany's Treuhandanstalt (trust department), will be needed. Currently, such responsibility is under the Ministry of Finance and Economy.
However, the privatization of land and national enterprises will be difficult to reform under the present organizational structures. If this causes an increase in the workload, the personnel in each office can be increased. Yet, in order for such steps to work, the tasks concerning the northern areas must not be greatly different from those of the south. However, they can in fact differ greatly by character. For example, housing policies will be fundamentally different by policy situations or policy demand. Policies for roads will be the same as well. Therefore entrusting one to two people on very different policies will be unreasonable. Having the existing offices take care of North Korea-related issues instead creating new organizations will only be possible in the long run.
Before that, most offices should choose one of the following alternatives: having a division for
North Korea-related issues in each required office, or having a main office that will take care of all North Korea-related issues so that other offices will not have to.
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Let us examine, for example, the Ministry of Construction & Transportation (MOCT). With unification, the territory of Korea will more than double, and naturally, the duties of the MOCT will drastically increase. The MOCT could either add a North Korea Division in each functional bureau or build one all-inclusive office exclusively for North Korean issues.
To further mention the add-on option, Ministries may add the following divisions specializing The second option would be to integrate all North Korea-related responsibilities to one newly established office. In this method, North-related tasks will be exclusively dealt with within this comprehensive office. Thus, satellite offices will not be present in any other divisions outside of the designated complex, therefore not disturbing the rest of the organization. This option will allow for greater ease when coordinating relevant policies regarding the North. However, it might have a weaker connection with policies on from South Korea.
Between these two methods, a phased approach may be the best solution. Until the early integration stage, the second option will be better as it is easier to handle all North Korean issues in a more comprehensive way. After latter parts of the integration stage, the first option will be a better choice. Eventually, the North Korean issue can be covered under the current 26 organizational structure with added staff in each division. However, the speed of this organizational transition depends on the extent to which responsibility expands due to integration.
Conclusion
North Korea is in a current state of uncertainty. Considering the large and loyal military sector, the North Korean regime may not easily collapse. However, there is the possibility that an unforeseen element can trigger a crisis of great suffering. It is therefore important to be prepared should an emergency suddenly surface.
In an emergency situation in the North, the most important task is to control crisis in advance to minimize negative impacts. The outcome of unification will greatly depend on how well these crises were dealt with in the early stages. After the measures of crisis management, policies for North Korea's economic development and economic integration with the South must follow as next steps.
The policy goal of the collapse stage is to control disorder on the Korean peninsula while expanding South Korea's influence in North Korea, eventually leading the situation to a wellmanaged unification of Korea. Therefore, announcing various measures, such as plans of aid of food and necessities, will lessen the massive panic in the early stages. Aid for overseas refugees and stabilization measures for the domestic economy must also be continued.
The policy goal of the integration stage is a well-managed unification led by South Korea and the stabilization of the Korean peninsula. The priority task in this stage is to pursue reconstruction and transitions of the North Korean economy while restraining North Koreans
